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SUZANNA SHERRY
THE UNMAKING OF A PRECEDENT
How far can you stretch precedent before it breaks? The 2002
Term suggests that some Justices seem to think that treating pre-
cedent like silly putty is preferable to acknowledging that it might
be in need of revision. But obvious inconsistencies in the applica-
tion of precedent are a strong indication of underlying doctrinal
problems. In this article, I suggest that the majority's misuse of
precedent in Nevada Department of Human Resources v Hibbs' should
lead us to question the soundness of the Supreme Court's previous
cases defining the limits of Congress's authority under Section 5
of the Fourteenth Amendment. But the cloud that Hibbs casts over
precedent has a silver lining: the ways in which the Court misused
its own precedent point us to a better and more coherent reading
of Section 5.
Other scholars who have criticized the Court for its Section 5
doctrine have argued that the Court's jurisprudence is fundamen-
tally mistaken because it misallocates authority between Congress
and the Court. I propose instead to take as a given that the Court
should police the boundaries of Congress's Section 5 power, and
that ultimately the Court rather than Congress must decide
whether a problem is sufficiently important to justify the congres-
sional response, including the abrogation of state immunity from
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suit. My suggested doctrinal revisions thus do not require a radical
shift for a Court determined to limit congressional authority. I also
remain agnostic on the soundness of particular outcomes. What-
ever we might think of the decisions in recent Section 5 cases, this
Court is unlikely to overrule them; the advantage of my approach
is that it preserves most of the cases but makes them consistent
with one another. Finally, my approach to Section 5 has the added
benefit of forcing the Court to be more candid about the value
choices that it inevitably makes. Note, then, that my purpose in
this article is limited: I do not mean either to critique or to defend
particular outcomes, but rather to make suggestions about the pro-
cess by which the Court should decide cases-although process
will inevitably have some effect on outcomes. Outcomes aside,
however, improvements in the judicial decision-making process in-
crease the Court's legitimacy, foster adherence to the rule of law,
and diminish the opportunities for abuse of judicial authority.
I
A
Hibbs was decided against a rich background of recent federalism
cases, many of them focusing on the contours of state sovereign
immunity. Between 1999 and 2001, the Court invalidated five dif-
ferent congressional statutes that attempted to permit individual
damage suits against states allegedly violating federal law. In each
case, the Court relied on the confluence of two earlier precedents:
Seminole Tribe of Florida v Florida,2 which held that Congress is
constitutionally permitted to abrogate state sovereign immunity
only when it acts under the powers granted by Section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment, and City of Boerne v Flores,3 which limited
the reach of Congress's Section 5 authority. The five subsequent
cases held that in order to justify abrogating immunity, Congress
must document a widespread pattern of unconstitutional action by
states, and must enact only a congruent and proportional remedy.
Among the federal statutes that failed this test were two that pro-
tected the aged and the disabled from discrimination.
2 517 US 44 (1996).
3521 US 507 (1997).
[2003
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During 2000 and 2001, eight United States Courts of Appeals
applied this line of precedent to determine whether Congress had
validly abrogated state immunity in the 1993 Family and Medical
Leave Act (FMLA),4 which, among other things, requires employers
to provide unpaid leave for employees who are caring for an ill fam-
ily member. Seven of the eight easily concluded that the FMLA
could not constitutionally abrogate state sovereign immunity-and
thus that individuals could not sue states for damages-because the
FMLA was not a valid exercise of Congress's Section 5 powers as
defined by the Supreme Court.' In 2002, the Supreme Court agreed
to hear an FMLA abrogation case from the Ninth Circuit, the only
appellate court that had upheld the abrogation.6 Experts confidently
predicted a reversal.
But in Hibbs, the Court affirmed the Ninth Circuit by a six to
three vote, upholding Congress's abrogation of state immunity in
the FMLA. The Court purported to rely entirely on existing prec-
edent, holding that the FMLA met the requirements first eluci-
dated in City of Boerne and elaborated in the subsequent cases. In
the remainder of Part I of this essay, I argue that the seven pre-
sumably surprised Courts of Appeals were unequivocally right-
and the Ninth Circuit and the Supreme Court wrong-in their
application of precedent. Despite the Court's protestations to the
contrary, under the precedents the FMLA is indistinguishable
from the previously invalidated statutes. In Part II, I discuss the
implications of this conclusion, and offer a revision of the Court's
test of the scope of congressional power.
B
The Supreme Court's sovereign immunity jurisprudence is by-
zantine, and the precedents have been subject to much academic
429 USC §§ 2611-54.
' See Laro v New Hampshire, 259 F3d 1 (1st Cir 2001); Lizzi v Alexander, 255 F3d 128
(4th Cir 2001); Townsel v Missouri, 233 F3d 1094 (8th Cir 2000); Chittister v Department
of Community & Economic Development, 226 F3d 223 (3d Cir 2000); Kazmier v Widmann,
225 F3d 519 (5th Cir 2000); Sim v University of Cincinnati, 219 F3d 559 (6th Cir 2000);
Hale v Mann, 219 F3d 61 (2d Cir 2000).
6 As it happens, the three judges on the panel were among the most liberal on the Ninth
Circuit, all appointed by Democratic presidents: Reinhardt (Carter), Tashima (Clinton),
and Berzon (Clinton).
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criticism.7 The basic doctrines, however, are fairly simple to state.
The Eleventh Amendment, which provides that "[t]he judicial
power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to
any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one
of the United States by citizens of another State," means both
more and less than it says. Despite its apparent limitation to "suits
in law or equity" brought by "citizens of another state," it also
prohibits suits in admiralty and suits brought by citizens of the
defendant state.8 Moreover, it embodies a principle that also pro-
tects unconsenting states from suits in their own courts.9 On the
other hand, "any suit" does not mean any suit; states are immune
from suits seeking damages but not from suits that are nominally
against state officials and seek purely prospective relief.1°
By themselves, these doctrines-some of which date back to the
turn of the last century-are quite protective of states. But
the Rehnquist Court raised the federalism stakes even higher at
the end of the twentieth century. Most of the earliest suits had
involved cases arising under state law, or cases in which it was not
clear that Congress intended federal law to permit suit against an
unconsenting state. But what if Congress determined that states
should be subject to suit for the violation of federal law? Could
Congress abrogate the states' immunity, at least to the extent that
that immunity was not dictated by the language of the Eleventh
' See, for example, Symposium, State Sovereign Immunity and the Eleventh Amendment, 75
Notre Dame L Rev 817 (2000); Edward A. Purcell, Jr., The Particularly Dubious Case of
Hans v. Louisiana: An Ersay on Law, Race, History, and "Federal Courts," 81 NC L Rev 1927
(2003); James E. Pfander, History and State Suability: An "Explanatory" Account of the Eleventh
Amendment, 83 Cornell L Rev 1269 (1998); Carlos Manuel Vazquez, What Is Eleventh
Amendment Immunity? 106 Yale L J 1683 (1997); Herbert Hovenkamp, Judicial Restraint and
Constitutional Federalism: The Supreme Court's Lopez and Seminole Tribe Decisions, 96 Colurn L
Rev 2213 (1996); Daniel Meltzer, The Seminole Decision and State Sovereign Immunity, 1996
Supreme Court Review 1; William A. Fletcher, The Diversity Explanation of the Eleventh
Amendment: A Reply to Critics, 56 U Chi L Rev 1261 (1989); Vicki C. Jackson, The Supreme
Court, the Eleventh Amendment and State Sovereign Immunity, 98 Yale L J 1 (1988); William
A. Fletcher, A Historical Interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment: A Narrow Construction of
an Affirmative Grant of Jurisdiction Rather Than a Prohibition Against Jurisdiction, 35 Stan L
Rev 1033 (1983); John J. Gibbons, The Eleventh Amendment and State Sovereign Immunity:
A Reinterpretation, 83 Colum L Rev 1889 (1983).
s Ex parte New York, 256 US 490 (1921) (admiralty); Hans v Louisiana, 134 US 1 (1890)
(in-state citizens).
9 Alden v Maine, 527 US 706 (1999).
'
0 Exparte Young, 209 US 123 (1908); Edelman v Jordan, 415 US 651 (1974).
[2003
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Amendment? In two pre-1990 cases, the Court said yes: in Fitzpa-
trick v Bitzer the Court held that states could be sued for damages
under Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, and in Pennsylvania
v Union Gas Company2 the Court held that states could be sued
for damages under the federal environmental statute CERCLA. In
both cases, the plaintiff was a citizen of the defendant state, so that
Congress was abrogating not the Eleventh Amendment itself but
its extension by the Court.
The primary difference between Fitzpatrick and Union Gas was
the source of Congress's power to enact the underlying statute.
Title VII was enacted under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, which gives Congress the power to "enforce, by appro-
priate legislation" the substantive provisions of the amendment.
CERCLA was enacted under the Commerce Clause. That differ-
ence became pivotal in 1996, when the Court overruled Union Gas
in Seminole Tribe of Florida v Florida." The Seminole Tribe case held
that Congress has no power to abrogate state sovereign immunity
unless it does so as a valid exercise of its Section 5 powers; the
Commerce Clause gives Congress authority to enact laws, and to
apply such laws to the states, but not to abrogate the states' immu-
nity from suit.
By itself, Seminole Tribe might not have served to curtail federal
power much. In 1996, established precedent gave Congress quite
broad latitude in determining how to "enforce" the Fourteenth
Amendment. But a year later, in a case that did not involve sover-
eign immunity, the Court sharply limited Congress's authority un-
der Section 5. In City of Boerne v Flores,14 the Court struck down
the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) as beyond Con-
gress's authority under Section 5. The Court held that RFRA was
an attempt to "enforce" an interest that was not actually protected
by the Constitution under the Court's own precedent. "Congress,"
Justice Kennedy's majority opinion declared, "does not enforce a
constitutional right by changing what the right is.'15
"1427 US 445 (1976).
12 491 US 1 (1989).
13 517 US 44 (1996).
14 521 US 507 (1997).
11 Id at 519.
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Thus began a series of cases in which the primary question was
whether, in abrogating state sovereign immunity, Congress was
enforcing existing constitutional rights or was instead creating new
rights. The former abrogations would be constitutional; the latter
would not. The Court eventually refined the test to hold that,
acting under Section 5, Congress could outlaw behavior beyond
that prohibited by the Constitution itself only if the legislation
was shown to be a "congruent and proportional" response to "a
widespread pattern" of unconstitutional action by the states. 6
From 1997 until 2003, the Court did not uphold a single federal
statute under this test. It struck down abrogations of immunity,
as beyond the scope of Section 5, in the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act (ADEA),17 the Americans With Disabilities Act
(ADA),18 the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA),' 9 the Lanham Act,2 °
and the Patent and Plant Variety Protection Remedy Clarification
Act.
21
Then in Hibbs the Court upheld the abrogation of state immu-
nity in the FMLA. So how is the FMLA different? Justice Rehn-
quist's majority opinion suggests two possibilities. First, because
gender, unlike age or disability, is a suspect classification subject to
intermediate scrutiny, Congress's power may be correspondingly
broader when it seeks to remedy or prevent gender discrimination.
Additionally or alternatively, Congress may have had sufficient evi-
dence of a pattern of state constitutional violations when it enacted
the FMLA. A close comparison between Hibbs and the earlier cases
shows that neither distinction is sound.
6 See City of Boerne 521 US at 520 ("congruence and proportionality"), 526 ("widespread
and persisting deprivation of constitutional rights"), 531 ("widespread pattern"); Florida Pre-
paid Postsecondary Educ Expense Bd v College Savings Bank, 527 US 627, 639 ("congruence
and proportionality"), 645 ("widespread and persisting deprivation of constitutional rights")
(1999); Kimel v Florida Board of Regents, 528 US 62, 81 ("congruence and proportionality"),
82 ("widespread pattern"), 90 ("widespread pattern"), 91 ("widespread and unconstitutional
... discrimination") (2000); Board of Trstees of the University of Alabama v Garrett, 531 US
356, 365 ("congruence and proportionality"), 368 ("history and pattern"), 372 ("congruence
and proportionality"), 373 ("serious pattern"), 373 ("marked pattern"), 374 ("congruent and
proportional") (2001).
1Kimel v Florida Board of Regents, 528 US 62 (2000).
l0 Board of Trustees of the University of Alabama v Garrett, 531 US 356 (2001).
9Alden v Maine, 527 US 706 (1999).
21 College Savings Bank v Fla Prepaid Postsecondary Educ Expense Bd, 527 US 666 (1999).
21 Fla Prepaid Postsecondary Educ Expense Bd v College Savings Bank, 527 US 627 (1999).
[2003
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C
In Hibbs, the Court twice noted that gender classifications are
subject to heightened scrutiny.22 It explained that because age and
disability discrimination are judged only under a rational basis test,
"it was easier for Congress to show a pattern of state constitutional
violations" in support of the FMLA than in support of the ADEA
or the ADA.23 But the doctrine of heightened scrutiny is of limited
relevance in this context. It means only that the state must have
a greater justification for discriminating on the basis of gender
than for discriminating on the basis of other traits. That might
mean that each individual instance of discrimination is more likely
to be unconstitutional, but it is not, under the Court's precedents,
a substitute for a congressional finding of a widespread pattern of
unconstitutional discrimination.
Imagine, for example, that states impose additional requirements
before granting driver's licenses to people over sixty-five and to
women of all ages, on the basis of evidence that those groups are
somewhat poorer drivers than the rest of the population. The addi-
tional requirements are rational, but probably not sufficiently im-
portant (or carefully enough tailored) to withstand intermediate
scrutiny; thus the requirements are constitutional with regard to
age but not with regard to gender. Evidence of such state behavior
would therefore support a federal law designed to prevent gender
discrimination, but not a federal law designed to prevent age dis-
crimination. Nevertheless, if states (or most states) do not place
these additional requirements on women seeking to obtain driver's
licenses, the hypothetical federal law is not valid under Section 5
regardless of the level of scrutiny. The differing levels of scrutiny
focus only on whether particular conduct is unconstitutional, not
on whether the states have broadly engaged in the conduct.
In other words, under the requirement that Congress have evi-
dence of a widespread pattern of unconstitutional state discrimina-
tion, the level of scrutiny affects only the unconstitutional portion
of the test: there must still be discrimination, by states, sufficient to
form a widespread pattern. Ultimately, then, the question is still re-
duced to whether there was more evidence of discrimination in
22 123 S Ct at 1978, 1982.
23 Id at 1982.
HeinOnline  -- 2003 Sup. Ct. Rev. 237 2003
238 THE SUPREME COURT REVIEW
Hibbs than in the earlier cases, and cannot be resolved by looking
purely at the nature of the discrimination itself. As the next section
shows, even assuming that all of the evidence before Congress
involved gender discrimination that was not carefully tailored to
achieve a sufficiently important state interest-and therefore
would not survive heightened scrutiny-it still did not add up to
any more of a pattern of unconstitutional action by states than did
the evidence in the earlier cases.
D
In determining whether there is a widespread pattern of uncon-
stitutional discrimination by states, the Court has carefully defined
each of the relevant terms. In particular, in striking down the
ADA's abrogation of immunity in Board of Trustees of the University
of Alabama v Garrett4 and the ADEA's abrogation in Kimel v Flor-
ida Board of Regents,2" the Court made clear that three inquiries
limit the type of evidence that can be used to justify a statute under
Section 5. Who, what, and how much all matter. In Hibbs, however,
the Court unquestioningly accepted the same type of evidence that
it had previously found insufficient to support the ADA or the
ADEA.
Discrimination by whom? In both Kimel and Garrett, the Court
reiterated that Congress may not abrogate state sovereign immu-
nity unless it finds a pattern of unconstitutional action by the states.
It therefore rejected evidence of discrimination by private compa-
nies and by municipalities and other government entities. In Kimel,
the Court explained that "the United States' argument that Con-
gress found substantial age discrimination in the private sector...
is beside the point."26 In Garrett, the Court refused to credit a con-
gressional finding that "society" had traditionally discriminated
against the disabled, because "the great majority of" the incidents
supporting that finding "[did] not deal with the activities of States."27
The plaintiffs in Garrett also argued that evidence of discrimination
by governmental actors other than states ought to count toward the
24531 US 356 (2001).
25 528 US 62 (2000).
26 Id at 90.
27 531 US at 369.
[2003
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pattern of discrimination, because local governments, too, are sub-
ject to the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court explicitly rejected
this argument, noting that because the Eleventh Amendment does
not protect local governments, "[i]t would make no sense to con-
sider constitutional violations on their part. "28
Under the precedent, then, Congress should not be able to rely
on evidence of discrimination by "society," by private parties, or
by local governments, nor should it be allowed to extrapolate from
such evidence to conclude that states must also be discriminating.
But in Hibbs, the Court casually relied on just such evidence. The
evidence cited by the Court included a 1990 Bureau of Labor Sta-
tistics study of private-sector employees and general testimony that
the public and private sectors were similar.29 The latter statements,
however, were made not during hearings on the FMLA, but during
1986 hearings on a different bill, never enacted, which would have
mandated parenting leave rather than leave to care for an ill family
member. The Court cited no support for its bald declaration that
evidence of parenting-leave discrimination was relevant to a find-
ing on family-care leave because both "implicate the same stereo-
types."30 Nor did it explain why evidence from 1986 was sufficient
to justify a different law enacted seven years later; this omission
is particularly glaring in light of the fact that between 1986 and
1993 more than half the states had adopted some form of family-
care leave.31 Thus, the extrapolation from private-sector discrimi-
nation to public-sector discrimination was no more warranted
when Congress passed the FMLA than when it enacted the ADEA
or the ADA. Under the precedents, the Court should have de-
manded more direct evidence of state discrimination.
What kind of discrimination? The crux of City of Boerne was that
the definition of the scope of constitutional protection-and thus
of constitutional violations-was a task for the judiciary rather
than the legislature. It was to guard against legislative redefinition
of constitutional rights that the Court required Congress to docu-
ment a widespread pattern of state transgressions against the Con-
stitution. A showing of state behavior that Congress thinks repre-
2RId at 368.
29 123 S Ct at 1979 & n 3.
30Id at 1979 n 5.
"Id at 1989 (Kennedy dissenting).
HeinOnline  -- 2003 Sup. Ct. Rev. 239 2003
240 THE SUPREME COURT REVIEW
hensible, but that is not unconstitutional, does not justify passage
of legislation under Section 5. The Court has repeatedly empha-
sized, by word and deed, just how sharp this dividing line is.
In City of Boerne itself, the distinction between constitutional and
statutory protection was the distinction between intentional reli-
gious discrimination and generally applicable policies with a dispa-
rate impact on religious observance. Shortly prior to the enactment
of RFRA, the Court held in Employment Division v Smith32 that, as
a general rule, only statutes that intentionally target religious prac-
tices violate the Constitution. RFRA, on the other hand, required
states to justify-by establishing a compelling interest-even neu-
tral statutes with an incidental effect on religious practices. Con-
gress heard evidence that many states had statutes and other poli-
cies with a disparate impact on religious practices. The Court,
however, found such evidence insufficient to establish a pattern
of constitutional violation: it demanded evidence that states were
deliberately interfering with religious practices, whether by tar-
geted statutes or by statutes whose generality was a mere pretext
for religious hostility.33 Evidence that states failed to exempt or
accommodate religious believers who were affected by generally
applicable laws was irrelevant because the failure to exempt or ac-
commodate does not violate the Constitution.
City of Boerne is admittedly unusual: the enactment of RFRA was
an obvious attempt by Congress to reverse the Supreme Court's
holding in Smith. This threat to the Court's interpretive suprem-
acy might have led it to overstate the limits on Section 5.4 Subse-
quent cases, however, have continued to insist on the same narrow
32 494 US 872 (1990).
33 521 US at 530-31. The lack of evidence was an important factor in the Court's invalida-
tion of RFRA. In Boerne the Court stated that the "lack of support in the legislative record
• . . is not RFRA's most serious shortcoming," id at 532, and then focused on the lack of
congruence and proportionality between the right and the remedy. By 2000, however, the
Court had apparently refined its views of the nature of the Boerne requirements, noting
that Boerne had rested on both grounds (without distinguishing between them in impor-
tance). Kimel v Florida Board of Regents, 528 US 62, 82 (2000). Later cases also tended to
focus more on the question of congressional evidence of a pattern of state violations than
on the issue of proportionality.
'" Several commentators have noted that the Court seemed to view RFRA as deliberate
defiance of the Court by Congress. See, for example, Robert C. Post and Reva B. Siegel,
Equal Protection by Law: Federal Antidiscrimination Legislation After Morrison and Kimel, 110
Yale L J 441, 461 (2000); Michael C. Dorf and Barry Friedman, Shared Constitutional Inter-
pretation, 2000 Supreme Court Review 61, 72.
[2003
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reading of Congress's powers, even where Congress clearly meant
no disrespect to the Court. Whether the Court would have devel-
oped the same rigid test had the Section 5 question first arisen in
the context of an Eleventh Amendment case is a matter for specu-
lation. But once the test was announced in City of Boerne, the Court
apparently found no need to modify or relax it even in the absence
of direct congressional challenges to the Court's authority.
Garrett, for example, provides confirmation that the difference
between intentional discrimination and disparate impact is crucial
in evaluating whether Congress has evidence of discrimination by
the states. In concluding that the ADA would not be a proportional
and congruent remedy even if Congress had found sufficient evi-
dence of a pattern of unconstitutional discrimination against the
disabled, the Court focused on the provision in the statute that
forbids "'utilizing standards, criteria, or methods of administration'
that disparately impact the disabled."35 This provision, among oth-
ers, was unwarranted in part because evidence of disparate impact
"is insufficient [to establish a constitutional violation] even where
the Fourteenth Amendment subjects state action to strict scru-
tiny. ' 36 Similarly, much of the evidence of state transgressions pre-
sented by Justice Breyer's dissent, but dismissed by the majority,
involved state failures to make accommodations, a failure that es-
sentially amounts to refusing to remedy a known disparate impact.
Toleration of even a known disparate impact is insufficient to es-
tablish a constitutional violation, and thus cannot be used to sup-
port a congressional determination that states are violating the
Constitution (unless Congress has evidence that the practice with
a disparate impact was adopted because of rather than in spite of its
impact-evidence that did not exist with regard to either the ADA
or the FMLA).37
A somewhat different distinction between statutory and consti-
tutional protection led to the invalidation of Congress's attempt to
subject the states to suit for patent infringement. In Florida Prepaid
Postsecondary Education Expense Board v College Savings Bank,38 the
Court adopted a narrow definition of what constitutes unconstitu-
" 531 US at 372.
361Id at 373.
37 Washington v Davis, 426 US 229 (1976).
38 527 US 627 (1999).
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tional state action with regard to patent infringement. The Court
has long held that a patent is a form of property protected by the
Fourteenth Amendment. But in Florida Prepaid, the Court focused
more specifically on whether the mere act of infringement is a
taking. It held that since the amendment prohibits states from tak-
ing property only if they. do so without due process, Congress
could not abrogate state immunity from patent infringement suits
unless it had evidence that states did not themselves provide ade-
quate remedies for infringement. In the absence of such evidence
the Court invalidated the abrogation.39
These cases make clear that the Court's Section 5 jurisprudence
demands a detailed and specific identification of the state's uncon-
stitutional conduct. Conduct that is merely similar or related to
unconstitutional conduct is insufficient, lest Congress slip over the
line into defining rather than enforcing constitutional rights. But
in Hibbs, the Court was not only vague about the exact nature of
the states' unconstitutional conduct, it also relied explicitly on evi-
dence of state behavior that the Court has previously held to be
constitutional.
In prior cases, the Court demanded that Congress identify pre-
cisely the constitutional violation it was attempting to remedy: "the
first step" in determining the constitutionality of an abrogation
of immunity "is to identify with some precision the scope of the
constitutional right at issue."' In Hibbs, however, even the Court
seemed unable to pin down exactly why existing state family-leave
policies were unconstitutional. It might be because such policies
sometimes discriminated against men by allowing women but not
men to take family leave; 41 it might be because states relied on
"invalid gender stereotypes"; 42 it might be because the policies
"perpetuated" such stereotypes;43 it might be because the absence
of an affirmative, gender-neutral family-leave policy gives employ-
ers an incentive to discriminate in hiring and promotion;' it might
" Concededly, in Florida Prepaid there was little evidence of any patent infringement by
states. The Court nevertheless carefully explained that evidence of mere infringement would
not be enough in any case.
"Garrett, 531 US at 365.
41 123 S Ct at 1979.
42 Id.
43 Id at 1981 n 10.
4Id at 1982-83.
[2003
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be simply because more women than men desire family leave;4 or
it might be because the stereotypes "created a self-fulfilling cycle"
that led more women than men to desire family-care leave. 46 For
each of these descriptions, the Court cited a small amount of em-
pirical evidence in support. Although I argue later that even added
together this evidence should have been insufficient to show a
widespread pattern, the Court's jumbling of what might be called
different theories of the nature of gender discrimination is in stark
contrast to its rigid refusal to credit subtle forms of discrimination
against the aged or the disabled.47
Justice Kennedy's concurrence in Garrett, which was joined by
Justice O'Connor, highlights this contrast. Justice Kennedy sensi-
tively described the type of discrimination that the ADA was de-
signed to remedy:
Prejudice, we are beginning to understand, arises not from
malice or hostile animus alone. It may result as well from in-
sensitivity caused by simple want of careful, rational reflection
or from some instinctive mechanism to guard against people
who appear to be different from ourselves .... There can be
little doubt, then, that persons with mental or physical impair-
ment are confronted with prejudice which can stem from indif-
ference or insecurity as well as from malicious ill will. 48
Despite this recognition that "discrimination" takes many forms,
Justices Kennedy and O'Connor nevertheless joined the majority
in holding that the ADA was not validly enacted under Section
5. The demands of state sovereignty impose a higher burden on
Congress: "The failure of a State to revise policies now seen as
incorrect.., does not always constitute the purposeful and inten-
tional action required to make out a violation of the Equal Protec-
tion Clause. ' 49 It is difficult to reconcile this insistence on a narrow
definition of discrimination for Section 5 purposes-despite an
awareness of its limitations-with the multiple descriptions of gen-
4 Ild at 1978 n 2, 1983.
Id at 1982.
47 One commentator finds "truly startling" the "extraordinarily generous account of the
constitutional harm of sex discrimination" in Hibbs. Robert C. Post, Foreword: Fashioning
the Legal Constitution: Courts, Culture, and Law, 117 Harv L Rev 4, 17 (2003).
4 531 US at 374-75 (Kennedy concurring).
4 Id at 375.
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der discrimination in Hibbs.5" Indeed, Justice Kennedy himself ap-
parently recognized the inconsistency, dissenting in Hibbs on the
ground that the FMLA was no more justified under Section 5 than
was the ADA. Justice O'Connor, however, joined both Justice
Kennedy's concurring opinion in Garrett and Chief Justice Rehn-
quist's majority opinion in Hibbs, creating a conflict difficult to
explain.
Even more difficult to understand is why the Hibbs Court found
some of the evidence relevant at all. The Court has consistently
held that state practices or policies that have a disparate impact
on women or minorities are neither facially unconstitutional, nor
subject to heightened scrutiny, unless they were adopted intention-
ally to discriminate.51 And the Court made clear in Geduldig v
Aiello52 and General Electric Company v Gilbert3 that distinctions
based on childbearing ability are not intentionally discriminatory
but merely have a disparate impact. Drawing a distinction between
"pregnant women and nonpregnant persons" is not gender dis-
crimination, according to precedent.54 One would think, therefore,
that state employment practices that have a disparate impact on
women because of societal patterns in childrearing (or other family
care) are similarly constitutional.
Nevertheless, in Hibbs the Court relied heavily on evidence
that inadequate family-leave policies have a disparate impact on
women. The Court cited approvingly the FMLA's own definition
of the "gender-based discrimination" it was designed to remedy:
"'due to the nature of the roles of men and women in our society,
the primary responsibility for family caretaking often falls on
women, and such responsibility affects the working lives of women
more than it affects the working lives of men.' 55 The Court also
" Compare Philip P. Frickey and Steven S. Smith, Judicial Review, the Congressional Process,
and the Federalism Cases: An Interdisciplinary Critique, 111 Yale L J 1707, 1726 (2002) (sug-
gesting that the Court in Garrett "applied to the legislative history a time-honored lawyerly
shredding technique, the piecemeal critique, in which the evidence was examined in seg-
mented fashion rather than for its cumulative impact").
" See Washington v Davis, 426 US 229 (1976); Personnel Administrator of Massachusetts v
Feeney, 442 US 256 (1979).
52 417 US 484 (1974).
53 429 US 125 (1976).
" Geduldig, 417 US at 497 n 20.
15 123 S Ct at 1978, quoting 29 USC § 2601(a)(5).
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pointed to evidence that "12 States provided their employees no
family leave ... to care for a seriously ill child or family member,"
and "many States provided no statutorily guaranteed right to fam-
ily leave." 6 It explained that an apparently gender-neutral policy
of providing leave to neither men nor women "would exclude far
more women than men from the workplace," because "[t]wo-thirds
of the nonprofessional caregivers for older, chronically ill or disa-
bled persons are women.""7 All of this evidence establishes only
that a number of states adopted policies with a disparate impact
on women. The Court did not suggest that any of these policies
were deliberately intended to discriminate. In establishing a pat-
tern of state constitutional violations, then, this evidence should
have been irrelevant in the same way that evidence of state refusals
to accommodate religious practices or disabilities was irrelevant to
the validity of RFRA or the ADA. Evidence of failure to remedy
a disparate impact is simply not enough, under the precedents, to
conclude that states are violating the Constitution by intentionally
discriminating.
A second limit on the type of discrimination that constitutes
evidence of a state pattern is that it must be exactly the conduct
for which Congress seeks to impose liability on the states. In Gar-
rett, the Court insisted that Congress identify a pattern of state
discrimination in employment, and rejected evidence of state dis-
crimination in other areas.5" Hibbs again ignored this limit, justi-
fying the FMLA's family-leave policy by interchangeably citing
evidence of general employment discrimination against women,
evidence of discrimination in the availability of parental leave,
and evidence of the availability of postpregnancy medical leaves
of different lengths.
Under the precedents, then, much of the evidence that the
Court relied on to find a pattern of unconstitutional action by the
states should have been excluded. With or without this evidence,
however, taking the approach of the earlier cases would suggest
56 Id at 1980-81. The Court includes statutory cites for only four states to support its
statement that "many" states provided no guaranteed leave, id at 1981 n 8, and even this
number is inflated because two of the states (Colorado and Kansas) were counted among
the twelve that lacked any family-leave policies. Compare id at 1981 n 7 with id at 1981
n 8.
s Id at 1983.
ss531 US at 368, 372 n 7.
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that there was insufficient evidence to find a widespread pattern of
state violations in any case. I conclude this section by contrasting
the amount of evidence found sufficient in Hibbs with the amount
of evidence found insufficient in Garrett and Kimel.
How much evidence of discrimination? The question of the amount
of evidence necessary to support a congressional exercise of power
under Section 5 raises several issues. Presumably, there is some
threshold below which the evidence does not support the finding
of a "widespread" pattern of state constitutional violations. As noted
above, there is also the question of which demonstrated instances
of classification or distinction should count as examples of unconsti-
tutional behavior. But before even reaching these questions, we
must identify indicia of reliability sufficient to credit the evidence.
Thus, in previous cases the Court has also concerned itself with the
type of evidence heard by Congress.
The Court has consistently refused to accept "anecdotal" or
"isolated" statements as proof of discrimination.59 In Garrett, the
Court dismissed "half a dozen examples" of arguably unconstitu-
tional discrimination." In Florida Prepaid, the Court found the
dearth of actual lawsuits prior to the enactment of the statute to
be evidence that states were not behaving unconstitutionally.6' In
Hibbs, by contrast, the Court's finding of discrimination beyond
that documented by state law-discussed below-rested almost
entirely on isolated statements in testimony that ranged over sev-
eral years.62 As far as the Court was concerned, moreover, not a
single lawsuit challenging state policies was necessary to establish
that states were rampantly violating the Constitution.
The more important question, however, is whether the evidence
supports an inference of a "widespread pattern" of state violations.
Two examples of patent infringement suits against the states (and
eight such suits over 110 years) were insufficient to establish a pat-
tern in Florida Prepaid.63 Examples of arguably unconstitutional con-
duct in five states were insufficient in Garrett.64 In Kimel, the Court
'gSee City of Boerne, 521 US at 531; Kimel, 528 US at 82, 89; Garrett, 531 US at 370.
'o 531 US at 369. The Court then lists only five such examples, suggesting that "half a
dozen" was a rough rounding.
61 527 US at 640.
62 123 S Ct at 1979-80.
63 527 US at 640.
14531 US at 369-70.
(2003
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held that proof of widespread unconstitutional action in California
governmental agencies would not establish a pattern and thus
"would have been insufficient to support Congress's 1974 extension
of the ADEA to every State of the Union."6 5 Similarly, in City of
Boerne the Court made a point of contrasting the voting rights legis-
lation upheld in South Carolina v Katzenbach,66 which targeted only
the limited number of jurisdictions in which constitutional violations
"had been most flagrant. '67 At the time Katzenbach was decided,
seven states and parts of four others were within the coverage of the
statute.6' The analysis in City of Boerne thus implies that violations by
seven to eleven states are not sufficient to establish a widespread
pattern justifying broad remedies, but only support limited congres-
sional action targeted at the offending states.69
At the time the FMLA was adopted, somewhere between
twenty-one and thirty states already had gender-neutral family-
leave policies.7" Of the remaining states, the Hibbs Court pointed
to a total of fourteen that "provided their employees no family
leave" and seven that had "childcare leave provisions that applied
to women only."71 As to the former, providing no family leave to
either male or female employees, of course, is gender-neutral and
constitutional, and so cannot provide evidence of a pattern of un-
constitutional action by states. Of the seven that allegedly provided
gender-based childcare leave, four in fact provided only pregnancy
disability leave.72 Providing leave for those who are disabled-
whether by pregnancy and delivery or because of some other tem-
porary medical condition-is not the same as providing childcare
or family-care leave only to women; there is no suggestion that
the four states failed to provide comparable leave to men who were
temporarily disabled. Moreover, as noted earlier, the Court's own
precedents hold that discrimination on the basis of pregnancy is
65 528 US at 90.
- 383 US 301 (1966).
67 City of Boerne, 521 US at 532-33.
61 See Katzenbacb, 383 US at 318.
69 Indeed, at least one article suggests that Congress will never again be able to amass
the amount of evidence that it had when enacting the Voting Rights Act. Frickey and Smith,
111 Yale L J at 1723 (cited in note 50).
71 See Hibbs, 123 S Ct at 1989 (Kennedy dissenting).
71 Id at 1980-81 & nn 6-8 (majority).
71 See id at 1980 n 6 (majority opinion), 1972 (Kennedy dissenting).
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constitutionally permitted, so even if the four states had provided
disability leave only to those employees whose temporary disability
was caused by pregnancy, they cannot count toward the pattern
of unconstitutional action.
That leaves exactly three states whose childcare-leave policies
likely violated the Equal Protection Clause.73 It is hard to see how
constitutional transgressions by three states form a "widespread
pattern" of unconstitutional state conduct, especially in light of
the precedent and the large number of states with gender-neutral
policies. Those three states, moreover, would not necessarily get
a free ride. In addition to the possibility of direct constitutional
challenges to their policies, City of Boerne's approval of Katzenbach
shows that Congress could have imposed on the three offending
states-but not on constitutionally innocent states-provisions
identical to those of the FMLA. Even if we count official state
policy more heavily than unsanctioned behavior by state actors-
which the Court did not appear to do-three states is still a very
small number. But it was enough for the Hibbs majority.
E
Some readers may remain unpersuaded that Hibbs cannot be rec-
onciled with precedent. It is, one might contend, at the edge of
the precedent but not beyond it.74 Whether or not Hibbs is the
case that stretches precedent to the breaking point hardly matters,
however. The Court's rigid requirement that Congress find a
widespread pattern of unconstitutional state action before exercis-
ing its powers under Section 5 will inevitably lead to a situation
in which the Court upholds another statute that cannot possibly
meet that test. Two possibilities are already working their way
through the lower courts.
First, the Tenth Circuit has, since Hibbs, invalidated the con-
gressional abrogation of immunity for suits brought under a differ-
ent section of the FMLA. The court held that requiring employers
to allow leave for an employee's own illness does not address gen-
" See id at 1980 n 6 (majority opinion), 1991 (Kennedy dissenting). As noted earlier,
this still does not show that even these states discriminated, or were likely to discriminate,
in the provision of family-care leave rather than parenting leave.
"An argument in favor of this position may be found in Post and Siegel, 112 Yale L J
at 1972-80 (cited in note 34).
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der discrimination and is therefore not a valid enactment under
Section 5.75 It would be difficult to reach a contrary result under
the current doctrine, but allowing states to be sued for failing to
provide family-care leave while protecting them from suits for fail-
ing to provide medical leave is not likely to be a satisfactory result
for the Court that decided Hibbs.
Another abrogation, currently percolating through the federal
courts, is also likely to pose difficulties under current doctrine. Un-
der Title VII, employers can be sued for employment practices
that have a disparate impact on racial minorities. Lower courts
have, so far, consistently allowed disparate-impact suits against
states despite claims of sovereign immunity.76 Under the Court's
precedents, however, this is a problematic abrogation. Since dispa-
rate impact itself does not violate the Equal Protection Clause,
Congress would have needed evidence that states were using prac-
tices with a disparate impact as a pretext, in order to intentionally
discriminate. In 1973, when Congress extended Title VII to the
states, such evidence may or may not have existed; but even if it
did, Congress did not find it necessary to include such evidence
in the legislative record (in large part because, with City of Boerne
some twenty years in the future, it didn't know it had to). 77 As in
Hibbs, then, a Court resistant to immunizing states from Title VII
suits alleging disparate impact would have a difficult time finding
the requisite legislative justification. Nevertheless, it is hard to imag-
ine that the Court would invalidate the abrogation: Title VII has
played a prominent role in mitigating the shameful history of race
relations in the United States, is popular with almost all segments
of the population, and is virtually sacrosanct. Striking down the
abrogation of immunity in that context would inevitably-and
intolerably-be read as a holding that the government is allowed
to discriminate on the basis of race. And given the Court's claim
in Hibbs that it was simply applying precedent-and the fact that
71 Brockman v Wyoming Dept of Family Servs, 342 F3d 1159 (10th Cir 2003). This is the
first case to be decided after Hibbs, but other courts invalidated this abrogation prior to
Hibbs. See cases cited in id at 1165 & n 3.
71 See In re Employment Discrimination Litigation, 198 F3d 1305 (11th Cir 1999); Okrhulik
v University of Arkansas, 255 F3d 615 (8th Cir 2000).
" The lower courts that have rejected sovereign immunity arguments in disparate-impact
cases point only to evidence that in 1973 states were using practices with a disparate impact,
not evidence that they were intentionally discriminating. See cases cited in note 76.
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lower courts rejecting sovereign-immunity arguments in disparate-
impact cases have unsurprisingly claimed to be following pre-Hibbs
Supreme Court precedent-it is likely that a Supreme Court
decision upholding the Title VII abrogation would treat precedent
similarly.
The problem remains then: whether in Hibbs or in some future
case, the evidence the Court finds sufficient to uphold an abroga-
tion will be no stronger in quality or quantity from that which led
it to invalidate other statutes. What are we to make of the Court's
attempt to portray its decision as simply an unproblematic applica-
tion of precedent? It is to that question that I now turn.
II
The result in Hibbs may be considered laudable, depending
on whether we prefer to protect employees caring for ill family
members or to protect sovereign states when the two interests con-
flict. So let us assume that the FMLA (including the abrogation
of immunity) is a statute that should, indeed, have been upheld by
the Supreme Court. The question is whether that assumption jus-
tifies the Court's decision. What should the Court do when the
result that it believes correct is foreclosed by precedent? Three
other cases from the Court's 2002 Term offer some illuminating
guidance about different Justices' answers to that question. I begin
by briefly examining those three cases, and then apply their lessons
to the issue of congressional abrogation of state immunity.
A
In some ways, one could not imagine a case further from Hibbs
than Demore v Kim.78 In K/m, the five Justices often labeled as con-
servative upheld the detention of a deportable alien, pending his
deportation hearing, despite the absence of any determination that
he was either dangerous or posed a flight risk. This result would
be neither surprising nor problematic but for a case two years ear-
lier: in June 2001, the Court in Zadvydas v Davis79 held that the
government could not indefinitely detain an alien whose legally
11 123 S Ct 1708 (2003).
79 533 US 678 (2001).
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mandated deportation was foiled by the unwillingness of any coun-
try to accept him. While the two cases are distinguishable on their
facts, they are utterly inconsistent in tone and approach. In Zadvy-
das, Justice Breyer's majority opinion held that "the Due Process
Clause applies to all 'persons' within the United States, including
aliens."8 It explicitly rejected the dissent's suggestion that remov-
able aliens are entitled only "to be free from detention that is arbi-
trary and capricious."81 In Kim, by contrast, the Court deferred to
Congress's decision not to utilize individualized hearings on dan-
gerousness or risk of flight, noting that "when the Government
deals with deportable aliens, the Due Process Clause does not re-
quire it to employ the least burdensome means to accomplish its
goal."82 Chief Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion further stated
that "this Court has firmly and repeatedly endorsed the proposi-
tion that Congress may make rules as to aliens that would be unac-
ceptable if applied to citizens"-and cited in support Justice Ken-
nedy's dissenting opinion in Zadvydas."3 Indeed, the opinion in Kim
cites Justice Kennedy's dissent in Zadvydas for legal support more
than it cites the majority opinion. And, as with Hibbs, the Supreme
Court's application of the precedent was unusual: four of the five
Courts of Appeals that had reached the question had found the
absence of a hearing for predeportation detention unconstitutional
under Zadvydas; the only court upholding such detention had ruled
before Zadvydas was decided.8 4
Does this mean that Kim was wrongly decided? No, no more
than my critique of the opinion in Hibbs demonstrates that it was
wrong. I simply suggest that Kim was a misapplication of prece-
dent. The Court-in particular, Justice O'Connor, who was the
only Justice to join the majority in both Zadvydas and Kim-had
changed its mind about the scope of congressional authority over
aliens. The reason for the change in views is not hard to fathom:
between the June 2001 decision in Zadvydas and the January 2003
01d at 693.
SI Id at 694-95 (majority opinion), 721 (Kennedy dissenting).
82123 S Ct at 1720.
83Id at 1717.
8 See Welch v Ashcroft, 293 F3d 213 (4th Cir 2002); Hoang v Comfort, 282 F3d 1247
(10th Cir 2002); KIm v Zigler, 276 F3d 523 (9th Cir 2002), rev'd sub nom Demore v Kim,
123 S Ct 1708 (2003); Patel v Zemski, 287 F3d 299 (3d Cir 2001); but see Parra v Perryman,
172 F3d 954 (7th Cir 1999) (upholding detention before Zadvydas).
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decision in Kim, America had become more sensitive to the dan-
gers that aliens might pose. Nevertheless, the Court in Kim did
not mention September 11, but instead pretended (as it had in
Hibbs) that it was simply applying established precedent.
Like Hibbs, Kim illustrates the Court's misuse of precedent, but
it does not offer any alternatives for a majority determined to reach
a result foreclosed by precedent. In another case from the 2002
Term, Justice O'Connor's majority opinion exhibits the same
problematic use of precedent as do Hibbs and Kim, but it can be
contrasted with the opinions of several other Justices in the major-
ity, hinting at an alternative approach to the question of what to
do with unpleasant precedent.
In Grutter v Bollinger,5 a slim majority upheld the University of
Michigan Law School's affirmative action program. Purportedly
applying strict scrutiny, the Court found that the program was nar-
rowly tailored to accomplish a compelling state interest in ob-
taining a racially diverse law school class. While a detailed discus-
sion of Grutter is beyond the scope of this article, even a cursory
examination demonstrates that this is not the strict scrutiny that
the Court has used in the past.
Justice O'Connor, in finding the program narrowly tailored, de-
ferred to the law school's own determination of the benefits of a
racially diverse student body, the lack of adequate alternative
methods for obtaining a racially diverse student body, the detri-
mental effect alternative methods might have on the law school,
and the temporary nature of the program.86 Not since Korematsu
v United States87 has the Court upheld a racially discriminatory
state policy under strict scrutiny, nor has it ever suggested that the
challenged program is due any deference from the Court-instead
it has always demanded that such programs be subjected to the
most searching examination.88
The majority in Grutter also uncritically accepted the law
school's representation that it was not seeking a fixed percentage
11 123 S Ct 2325.
' See id at 2338, 2339-40, 2345, 2346.
7 323 US 214 (1944).
" See, for example, Adarand Constructors, Inc. v Pena, 515 US 200 (1995); City of Richmond
v J.A. Croson Co., 488 US 469 (1989); Wygant v Jackson Board of Education, 476 US 267
(1986).
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of minority students (i.e., an unconstitutional quota), but rather a
"critical mass" that would prevent minority students from feeling
isolated.89 That "critical mass," however, varied by racial group:
for Native Americans the critical mass ranged from 13 to 19 stu-
dents, for Hispanics it was 47 to 56, and for African Americans it
was between 91 and 108."0 This "critical mass" of each group was,
in almost every year (of a six-year period), within half a point of
the percentage of applicants of that racial group.9' Further, the
admissions director consulted daily reports on the percentage of
minority applicants admitted during the months-long admissions
process. 92 This evidence at least raises the question whether the
law school was candid in its assertion that it was not imposing
racial quotas, but the majority did not probe that assertion.
Four other Justices-Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and
Breyer-joined Justice O'Connor's opinion in Grutter. Their
views on the precedent, however, apparently differed from hers.
Justice Ginsburg wrote a dissenting opinion in a companion case,
Gratz v Bollinger93 (which invalidated the University of Michigan's
undergraduate affirmative action program). Joined in relevant part
by Justices Souter and Breyer, Justice Ginsburg took issue with the
majority's insistence "that the same standard of review controls judi-
cial inspection of all official race classifications. '"" Instead, she sug-
gested, "[a]ctions designed to burden groups long denied full citizen-
ship stature are not sensibly ranked with measures taken to hasten
the day when entrenched discrimination and its after effects have
been extirpated." 95 Justice Stevens has long advocated a similar ap-
proach, suggesting that Equal Protection challenges be resolved by
using a sliding scale rather than the current regime of three indepen-
dent levels of scrutiny.9 6 These Justices, then, joined Justice O'Con-
11 123 S Ct at 2339, 2343.
90 Id at 2366 (Rehnquist dissenting).
91 Id at 2368.
92 Id at 2343 (majority opinion), 2372 (Kennedy dissenting).
13 123 S Ct at 2411 (2003).
' Id at 2442 (Ginsburg dissenting).
95 Id at 2444.
96 See, for example, Craig v Boren, 429 US 190, 211-12 (1976) (Stevens concurring):
There is only one Equal Protection Clause. It requires every State to govern im-
partially. It does not direct the courts to apply one standard of review in some
cases and a different standard in other cases. I am inclined to believe that what
has become known as the two-tiered analysis of equal protection claims does not
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nor in finding the law school's program constitutional, but did not
need to assert that the program should survive strict scrutiny-
which, under the precedent, it most certainly should not have.97
An illuminating contrast to Hibbs, Grutter, and Kim may be
found in another of the Court's decisions during the 2002 Term.
In Lawrence v Texas,98 six Justices voted to invalidate Texas's law
prohibiting homosexual (but not heterosexual) sodomy. Like the
outcome in Hibbs, this is a result that many applaud. But unlike
Hibbs, only one Justice tried to pretend that the decision was con-
sistent with earlier precedent. Justice Kennedy's majority opinion
instead forthrightly overruled the inconsistent precedent of Bowers
v Hardwick.99 Only Justice O'Connor, concurring in the judgment,
distinguished Hardwick. A brief examination of both cases demon-
strates that Justice O'Connor's (mis)treatment of precedent in
Lawrence is similar to the (mis)treatment of precedent in her Grut-
ter opinion and in Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinion in Hibbs
(which she joined).
In Hardwick, Justice White's opinion for the Court (which Jus-
tice O'Connor also joined) upheld a Georgia statute that crimi-
nalized sodomy between consenting adults. Those challenging the
law suggested that it lacked a rational basis because it was based
solely on the Georgia legislature's view that homosexual conduct
was immoral. The Court explicitly rejected this argument that
"majority sentiments about the morality of homosexual conduct
should be declared inadequate" to provide a rational basis for the
law.1°° Moreover, in Hardwick the Court framed the issue as
"whether the Federal Constitution confers a fundamental right
describe a completely logical method of deciding cases, but rather is a method
the Court has employed to explain decisions that actually apply a single standard
in a reasonably consistent fashion.
See also Adarand v Pena, 515 US 200, 245-46 (1995) (Stevens dissenting) ("a single
standard that purports to equate remedial preferences with invidious discrimination cannot
be defended in the name of 'equal protection').
" There is still the question why these four Justices joined Justice O'Connor's opinion
rather than simply concurring in the result. The explanation is, I believe, institutional: a
fractured case with no majority opinion would simply replicate Regents of the University of
California v Bakke, 438 US 265 (1978), and all of the uncertainty it generated. However
difficult to interpret and apply, Justice O'Connor's opinion in Grutter is at least an opinion
for the Court.
98 123 S Ct 2472 (2003).
9 478 US 186 (1986), overruled in Lawrence, 123 S Ct at 2484.
11478 US at 196.
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upon homosexuals to engage in sodomy, '. °' suggesting that it fo-
cused on purely homosexual conduct despite the fact that the chal-
lenged Georgia statute prohibited all sodomy. Indeed, the Court
explicitly declined to decide the constitutionality of the statute as
applied to a married heterosexual couple. °2 Yet in Lawrence, Justice
O'Connor found that distinguishing between heterosexual and ho-
mosexual sodomy lacked a rational basis.1"3 If a majority of Georgia
citizens can ban sodomy simply because they think homosexuality
is immoral, and the Court in upholding the ban does not care
whether it could constitutionally be applied to heterosexuals, it is
hard to see how a morality-based ban on homosexual sodomy lacks
a rational basis.
All eight of the other Justices agreed that adhering to Hardwick
would require the Court to uphold the Texas statute. So the five
Justices who found such a result intolerable under our Constitution
refused to hide behind false distinctions, and instead bluntly de-
clared Hardwick to be flawed and overruled it. (The other three
dissented, and would have upheld the Texas statute.) Whether one
agrees with the overruling or not, at least it confronts the prece-
dent rather than distorting it.
In Hibbs and these three other high-profile cases, then, some
Justices seemed determined to uphold precedent even when it re-
quired them to twist that precedent beyond recognition in order
to reach particular results. In two of the cases, other Justices who
reached the same results chose a different course, implicitly or ex-
plicitly rejecting the precedent. What might this phenomenon
teach us about the Court's Section 5 jurisprudence?
B
I draw two inferences from Hibbs and these additional illustrative
cases. The first is obvious: faced with uncomfortably constraining
precedent, the Court has a choice between dissembling or forth-
rightly admitting error. Too often, some current Justices seem to
prefer the former. This lack of candor is unfortunate for several
reasons. To begin with, it undermines the normative legitimacy
"I Id at 190 (emphasis added).
'0 Id at 188 n 2.
0 123 S Ct at 2484.
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of courts. It transforms the rule of law into the rule of men by
allowing judges to reach their preferred results without confront-
ing doctrinal inconsistencies. In a democratic regime, dissembling
by government actors also deprives the citizenry of information
necessary for deliberation and decision making. Lack of candor is
particularly dangerous in unelected judges, because for them visi-
ble rationality is a substitute for democratic accountability. Distor-
tion of precedent thus exacerbates the tension between popular
democracy and constitutional democracy by disguising the reasons
for judicial decisions. At a more practical level, it creates great un-
certainty by freeing courts, especially lower courts, from any real
constraints that might be imposed by precedent. Moreover, a lack
of constraints can make more problematic the judiciary's counter-
majoritarian aspect, and thus leave the courts more vulnerable to
criticism.
The second inference from Hibbs is more subtle: the more ap-
parent the dissembling-the easier it is to show that adherence to
precedent demands a different result than that reached by the
Court-the clearer the conclusion that the precedent itself is
flawed. Every manifest distortion of precedent costs the Court in
loss of legitimacy, and the expenditure is only justified when the
course dictated by precedent is even more intolerable. If adherence
to precedent demands an intolerable result, however, there must
be something seriously wrong with the precedent.
Thus, what we learn from Hibbs is that the Court's sovereign
immunity doctrine is a mistake. Combining the limits of Seminole
Tribe and City of Boerne constrains Congress in ways that even
some Justices most supportive of states' rights cannot stomach.
Two alternatives present themselves. The more radical is to
overrule Seminole Tribe. The academic literature and the dissenting
opinions in Seminole Tribe and Alden v Maine provide strong rea-
sons in favor of that approach. Limiting Congress to its Section
5 powers in abrogating state sovereign immunity is a poor inter-
pretation of the relevant constitutional provisions.1°4 I have little
to contribute here to that argument, although I think it is correct.
However, it is an argument that has no chance of persuading the
present Court.
"4 See Alden v Maine, 527 US 706, 762-808 (1999) (Souter dissenting); Seminole Tribe
of Florida v Florida, 517 US 44, 101-85 (1996) (Souter dissenting); and literature cited in
both cases.
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If Seminole Tribe remains good law, then the alternative is to
overrule or change current doctrine on Congress's Section 5 pow-
ers. Along those lines, others have criticized City of Boerne and its
progeny. These critiques, however, are essentially all variants of
one of two complaints: that the Court should not arrogate to itself
the sole power to determine the meaning of the substantive provis-
ions of the Fourteenth Amendment or that the Court should give
more deference to Congress's determination that a particular law
is necessary to prevent or remedy constitutional violations.10 5 The
persuasiveness of these critiques ultimately rests on one's view of
judicial supremacy: to what extent should the Court be the final,
authoritative, or sole interpreter of the Constitution, and when-
if at all-should it defer to congressional judgments? Interesting
as that debate may be, it appears to have had no effect on the
Court itself; commentators have recently noted that the Court's
self-aggrandizement actually appears to be increasing.1"6
I therefore propose instead to accept the premise that it is the
Court's job, and not Congress's, to determine the boundaries of
the substantive provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment (as well
as of the rest of the Constitution), and that demanding close con-
gruence between the perceived problem and the enacted remedy
is the way to enforce that division of authority. But the City of
Boerne test is not the only possible method of ensuring that Con-
gress does not transgress constitutional bounds. The majority
opinion in Hibbs, for all its flaws, can be used to craft a revised
"' See, for example, John T. Noonan, Jr., Narrowing the Nation's Power: The Supreme
Court Sides with the States (California, 2002); Post and Siegel, 112 Yale L J (cited in note
34); Robert C. Post and Reva B. Siegel, Protecting the Constitution from the People: Juricentric
Restrictions on Section Five Power, 78 Ind L J 1 (2003); Susan Bandes, Fear and Degradation
in Alabama: The Emotional Subtext of University of Alabama v. Garrett, 5 U Pa J Const L
520, 532-34 (2003); Frickey and Smith, 111 Yale LJ (cited in note 50); William W. Buzbee
and Robert A. Schapiro, Legislative Record Review, 54 Stan L Rev 87 (2001); Evan H. Camin-
ker, "Appropriate" Means-Ends Constraints on Section 5 Powers, 53 Stan L Rev 1127 (2001);
Ruth Colker and JamesJ. Brudney, Dissing Congress, 100 Mich L Rev 80 (2001); Christopher
Bryant and Timothy J. Simeone, Remanding to Congress: The Supreme Court's New "On the
Record" Constitutional Review of Federal Statutes, 86 Cornell L Rev 328 (2001); Melissa Hart,
Conflating Scope of Right with Standard of Review: The Supreme Court's "Strict Scrutiny" of
Congressional Efforts to Enforce the Fourteenth Amendment, 46 Vill L Rev 1091 (2001). For a
defense of the federalism principles underlying the Section 5 abrogation cases, see Lynn
A. Baker and Ernest A. Young, Federalism and the Double Standard of Judicial Review, 51
Duke L J 75 (2001).
1 See, for example, Larry D. Kramer, Foreword: We the Court, 115 Harv L Rev 5, 128-58
(2001).
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test that keeps intact the results in the prior cases (with the possible
partial exception of Garrett) but nevertheless upholds the FMLA
as a valid exercise of Congress's Section 5 authority. Note again
that the soundness of any of the decisions or of the underlying
constitutional vision is beside the point; my quarrel with the Court
here is not its results (or its interpretation of the Constitution) but
its past and future use of precedent.
The key recognition lurking below the surface in Hibbs is that
gender discrimination (and, by implication, race discrimination) is
different from, and more invidious than, other types of discrimina-
tion.0 7 The majority opinion dances around this question, and
never quite admits that this distinction underlies its holding. The
Court tries to use the fact that gender discrimination is subject to
heightened scrutiny in order to shoehorn the FMLA into the
structure established by the earlier cases without forcing its invali-
dation. As I argued above, this move fails. But the fact that gender
discrimination is subject to heightened scrutiny also suggests that
it is more problematic than other types of discrimination. The
Court-rightly or wrongly-perceives age discrimination and dis-
ability discrimination, like practices with a disparate impact on mi-
norities, women, or religious observers, as somehow not "real"
problems.' °8 Perhaps the cause for the different perceptions is the
recentness of the American recognition that age or disability dis-
crimination is a problem at all; perhaps it is that there is still con-
troversy about the extent of the problem; perhaps it is that age
and, especially, disability discrimination are more complex, in part
because they are intertwined with questions of accommodation and
allocation of resources rather than always arising from stereotypes
"I See also Post and Siegel, 112 Yale L J at 1979-80 (cited in note 34) (predicting, prior
to the decision in Hibbs, that "it is possible that the Court will decide the case on the basis
of its attitude toward the substantive civil rights agenda advanced by the FMLA"); Bandes,
5 U PaJ Const L at 521 (cited in note 105) (characterizing Garrett as "animated by empathy
for some actors and lack of empathy toward others"); Jed Rubenfeld, The Anti-Antidiscrimi-
nation Agenda, 111 Yale L J 1141 (2002) (suggesting that Court views "traditional" antidis-
crimination law as more justifiable than recent extensions); compare Richard H. Fallon, Jr.,
The "Conservative" Paths of the Rehnquist Court's Federalism Decisions, 69 U Chi L Rev 429
(2002) (suggesting that inconsistencies in the Court's federalism doctrines are driven by an
underlying conservative substantive agenda).
0' I argue elsewhere that the Court has taken a similarly unconcerned approach to sexual
orientation discrimination. See Suzanna Sherry, Warning: Labeling Constitutions May Be Haz-
ardous to Your Regime, 67 L & Contemp Probs (forthcoming 2004).
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or simple prejudice. 9 Whatever the source, the distortion of prec-
edent in Hibbs reflects a different attitude toward gender discrimi-
nation than toward (some) other types of discrimination. 10
But what if we were to take this insight and use it to revise the
precedent rather than simply to drive results? If gender discrimina-
tion is worse than age discrimination, then we should be more
willing to sacrifice the states' immunity from suit in the service of
eradicating gender discrimination. This in turn implies that the
Court should abandon its current rigid stance of requiring that
every exercise of Congress's power under Section 5 be supported
by a fixed quantum of evidence of particular state behaviors, and
instead adopt a more flexible balancing test. The scope of Con-
gress's Section 5 power should turn on some unquantifiable rela-
tionship between the need for the legislation and the harm it
causes to states."' Where the Court finds that Congress is tram-
pling on the states for little reason, it should invalidate the abroga-
tion. Where the importance of the federal statute outweighs its
detrimental effect on states, the abrogation should be upheld."2
"I For a wonderful exploration of the interaction between the Court and American cul-
ture as it plays out in the context of gender discrimination, see Post, 117 Harv L Rev at
11-41 (cited in note 47).
"0 Suggesting that the Court implicitly views gender discrimination as more problematic
-particularly in the context of Section 5-raises questions about United States v Morrison,
529 US 598 (2000), in which the Court struck down a portion of the federal Violence
Against Women Act (VAWA). The Court found that creating a federal civil remedy for
gender-motivated violence exceeded Congress's authority under both the Commerce Clause
and Section 5. But the puzzle is more apparent than real: the question in Morrison was
whether Congress could regulate individual behavior-rather than state behavior-under
Section 5; resolution of that question need not depend on how abhorrent the Court finds
the individual behavior. Alternatively, one might speculate that the Court envisions a con-
tinuum of invidiousness, so that race discrimination justifies even greater congressional au-
thority than does gender discrimination. This latter approach has the further advantage of
reconciling Morrison with the apparently contrary result in United States v Guest, 383 US
745 (1966).
11 One might argue that Justice Kennedy adopted such a test in his dissent in Hibbs by
framing the question as whether "subjecting States and their treasuries to monetary liability
at the insistence of private litigants is a congruent and proportional response to a demon-
strated pattern of unconstitutional conduct by the States." 123 S Ct at 1986. See Post,
Harv L Rev at 23 n 105 (cited in note 47).
112 Although I suggest that such a flexible test should be applied to Congress's exercise
of its Section 5 powers, an alternative argument might propose it as a measure of Congress's
overall ability to abrogate state sovereign immunity, whether under Section 5 or under
Article I. Such a reframing of my argument, however, would directly confront the holding
in Seminole Tribe, which seems (especially after Hibbs) less vulnerable than City of Boerne
and its progeny.
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For those readers who blanch at the prospect of such an uncon-
strained approach, let me make two admissions and then point to
an area in which just such a test has worked tolerably well. First,
my test will predictably produce more unpredictable results than
the Court's current test. But the Court's (mis)application of the
current test managed to produce the surprising result in Hibbs; the
only difference between the Court's approach and mine is that
mine could produce the result in Hibbs without mangling the test
itself. Second, to the extent that one disagrees with the Court's
assessment of the problem Congress is addressing-that is, finds
a particular kind of discrimination to be more or less problematic
than the Court does-one will not be happy with the Court's deci-
sions under my test. For readers afraid of that eventuality, let me
ask you: are you happy now? Liberals are appalled by Kimel and
Garrett, conservatives think Hibbs is a disaster, and, as far as I can
tell, almost everybody dislikes City of Boerne.113 So why not have
the Court admit that it is drawing distinctions among types of dis-
crimination and put its weighting of the interests out in the open?
In an analogous area, this kind of open-ended approach has
worked very well. Of all the cases that come before the Supreme
Court, the cases most similar to those raising federalism issues are
those raising separation-of-powers questions.1 4 Both separation of
powers and federalism implicate basic structure, and both serve to
balance power and check potential abuses. We recognize this af-
finity when we teach federalism and separation of powers in one
course and individual rights in another. Indeed, sometimes is it
difficult to tell the difference between a separation-of-powers ques-
tion and a federalism question. The Section 5 cases are a good
example of this overlap: City of Boerne was primarily about the allo-
cation of authority between Congress and the courts, but in the
13 But see Marci A. Hamilton and David Schoenbrod, The Reaffirmation of Proportionality
Analysis Under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, 21 Cardozo L Rev 469 (1999) (defense
of City of Boerne by one of the City's attorneys); Ronald D. Rotunda, The Powers of Congress
Under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment After City of Boerne v. Flores, 32 Ind L Rev 163
(1998) (defending City of Boerne); Ira C. Lupu, Why the Congress Was Wrong and the Court
Was Right: Reflections on City of Boerne v. Flores, 39 Wm & Mary L Rev 793 (1998) (partial
defense of City of Boerne); William P. Marshall, The Religious Freedom Restoration Act: Estah-
lishment, Equal Protection, and Free Speech Concerns, 56 Mont L Rev 227 (1995) (expressing
doubts about RFRA's constitutionality before City of Boerne).
.14 Others have noted the relationship, especially in the context of congressional abroga-
tion of state sovereign immunity. See, for example, Colker and Brudney, 100 Mich L Rev
(cited in note 105).
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context of abrogation of sovereign immunity the Section 5 juris-
prudence serves mostly to protect the states from congressional
overreaching."' 5
Thus, in searching for an alternative approach to defining the
scope of congressional powers under Section 5, we might look to
separation-of-powers cases. In particular, the Supreme Court has
long struggled to determine what powers of adjudication Congress
can confer on courts that do not meet the requirements of Article
Ill. These courts, whose judges are not life-tenured, are sometimes
called legislative courts. Examples include military courts, territo-
rial courts and local courts for the District of Columbia, and most
administrative agencies. Under what circumstances can an agency
or other specialized body resolve disputes that might otherwise be
decided by an Article III court? After briefly flirting with a rigid
rule prohibiting legislative courts from deciding any matter that
would be within the constitutional jurisdiction of Article III courts,
the Supreme Court recognized that the jurisdiction of Article III
courts and legislative courts might overlap." 6 The question then
became defining the limits of legislative courts' jurisdiction.
Like determining the scope of congressional power under Sec-
tion 5, defining the jurisdiction of legislative courts raises questions
about how to allow Congress sufficient flexibility without aban-
doning judicially enforced constraints. Too few limits will allow
Congress to undermine the independence of the judiciary or the
sovereignty of states; too many limits will prevent Congress from
enacting needed legislation. Facing such a situation in the context
of legislative courts, the Court expressly eschewed bright-line
rules: "Although such rules might lend a greater degree of coher-
ence to this area of the law, they might also unduly constrict Con-
gress's ability to take needed and innovative action pursuant to its
Article I powers." '17 Instead, the Court has considered a number
of factors, always with an eye to determining whether the danger
I Scholars vary in whether they treat the abrogation cases as raising primarily federalism
questions or primarily separation-of-powers questions. Compare, for example, Fallon, 69
U Chi L Rev (cited in note 107) (federalism) with Post and Siegel, 112 Yale L J (cited in
note 34) (separation of powers).
16 See Williams v United States, 289 US 553 (1933) (no overlap permitted); Glidden Co.
v Zdanok, 370 US 530 (1962) (overlap permitted); Palmore v United States, 411 US 389
(1973) (flexible test adopted).
' Commodities Futures Trading Commission v Schor, 478 US 833, 851 (1986).
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of subverting judicial independence outweighs Congress's practical
need to resort to a legislative court. In Commodities Futures Trading
Commission v Schor,"' for example, the Court upheld the allocation
of a state-law counterclaim to a legislative court, but noted that
Congress could not create "a phalanx of non-Article III tribunals
equipped to handle the entire business of the Article III courts
... without evidence of valid and specific legislative necessities. '"119
The danger of such a scheme, the Court recognized, was that Con-
gress might be "'transfer[ing] jurisdiction [to non-Article III tribu-
nals] for the purpose of emasculating' constitutional courts."'2
Ironically, Justice O'Connor-who has recently been applying
rigid precedent in flexible ways-authored the majority opinion in
Schor.
This flexible approach, ultimately policed by Article III courts,
has allowed Congress to create myriad administrative agencies, lo-
cal courts for the District of Columbia,12' non-Article III courts
with specialized subject matter jurisdiction,'22 and provisions that
require certain disputes to be resolved by binding arbitration.'23
But the Court drew the line and invalidated Congress's attempt
to confer on a set of non-Article III courts jurisdiction to decide
all civil claims related to a bankruptcy proceeding, including the
power to preside over jury trials and the authority to issue declara-
tory judgments, writs of habeas corpus, and any other order neces-
sary for enforcement of their own judgments.'24
Adopting a test used to define the boundaries of jurisdiction is
especially apt in light of the Court's stated mission in its Section
5 cases. As many scholars have noted, the Court's careful scrutiny
of congressional enactments under Section 5 is a way of ensuring
that Congress does not use its enforcement powers as a pretext to
surreptitiously redefine the substantive meaning of the Fourteenth
118478 US 833 (1986).
Id at 855.
0 Id at 850, quoting Chief Justice Vinson's dissenting opinion in National Mutual Insur-
ance Co. v Tidewater Co., 337 US 582, 644 (1949).
121Palmore v United States, 411 US 389 (1973).
122 Ex parte Bakelite Corp., 279 US 438 (1929).
123 Thomas v Union Carbide Agricultural Products Co., 473 US 568 (1985).
'
24 Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 US 50 (1982).
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Amendment.125 While such an illicit motive was arguably apparent
on the surface of RFRA and its legislative history, it will not always
be easy to tell the difference between an honest congressional at-
tempt at prophylaxis and a statute passed to expand rather than
enforce constitutional mandates. In evaluating Section 5 legisla-
tion, demanding a sufficient reason for congressional action serves
to guard against hard-to-detect illicit motives. The balancing test
used in the context of legislative courts serves an analogous pur-
pose: it guards against intentional subversions of judicial indepen-
dence masquerading as mere administrative rearranging.126 To the
extent that Congress assigns to non-Article III courts a broader
range of cases than is practically necessary, we might suspect that
it is doing so because it wishes to control the body making the
decisions. And to the extent that Congress fashions an overinclu-
sive statutory remedy to an underdocumented constitutional prob-
lem, we might suspect that Congress is more interested in creating
rights than in enforcing them.'27
An open-ended balancing approach would allow the Court to
place as much weight as it wished on the need to protect states
from suit, while still permitting Congress to abrogate immunity
in the service of what the Court considers important goals. Evi-
dence of unconstitutional state behavior would be one relevant
factor but would not be dispositive. Additional factors could in-
2 See, for example, Post, 117 Harv L Rev at 12 (cited in note 47); Buzbee and Schapiro,
54 Stan L Rev at 136-39 (cited in note 105); Vicki C. Jackson, Federalism and the Court:
Congress as the Audience? 574 Annals (AAPSS) 145, 150-51 (2001); Dorf and Friedman,
2000 Supreme Court Review at 93 (cited in note 34); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Foreword:
Implementing the Constitution, 111 Harv L Rev 54, 131-32 (1997); but see Caminker, 53
Stan L Rev at 1166-68 (cited in note 105).
26 The alternative approach to smoking out illicit motives-bright-line tests that purport
to measure mechanically the congruence between means and ends-is reflected not only
in the Section 5 cases but also in long-established equal protection doctrine. My argument
in text is that separation-of-powers cases provide a better model than do individual-rights
cases when, as in the Section 5 context, the Court is policing federalism and interbranch
relations. For a critique of the Court's apparent equating of states to individual rights-
holders, see Suzanna Sherry, States Are People Too, 75 Notre Dame L Rev 1121 (2000).
527 There is, of course, still the question of whether the Court ought to distrust congres-
sional motives in this context. For a variety of views on this question, see, for example,
Suzanna Sherry, Irresponsibility Breeds Contempt, 6 Green Bag 2d 47 (2002); Colker and
Brudney, 100 Mich L Rev (cited in note 105); Buzbee and Schapiro, 54 Stan L Rev. at
141-43 (cited in note 105); Caminker, 53 Stan L Rev at 1182-83 (cited in note 105); Neal
Devins, Congress as Culprit: How Lawmakers Spurred on the Court's Anti-Congress Crusade, 51
Duke L J 435 (2001).
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clude the breadth of the statute (currendy encompassed by the
"congruence and proportionality" part of the test) and the Court's
own judgment about the importance of the statutory goal. But in
contrast to the Court's decision in Hibbs, which tried to disguise
the Court's valuation of the goal as the mechanical measuring of
the quantum of evidence, under a balancing test the Court would
have to discuss candidly the reasons it found the intrusion on state
sovereignty more or less warranted than in prior cases.12
That candor, moreover, might have a salutary effect on the deci-
sions themselves. A Court forced to confront head-on the clash
between state sovereignty and the interests of the disabled, for ex-
ample, could no longer hide behind a pretense that the ADA's
flaws lie in the congressional record. Instead, the Court would have
to choose between openly admitting that it finds discrimination
against the disabled more tolerable than race or gender discrimina-
tion, or engaging in a more sensitive and nuanced discussion of
the burdens that the ADA puts on states. One possible result of
this more careful analysis might be a distinction between the pure
antidiscrimination provisions and the accommodation provisions
of the ADA, with abrogation upheld for the former but not the
latter. Such a distinction makes sense on several levels. It recog-
nizes the difference between prejudice and less invidious reasons
underlying discrimination. It takes into account the greater bur-
dens that accommodation requirements place on employers. It
distinguishes between intentional discrimination and failure to
remedy a known disparate impact. And, finally, it is pragmatically
defensible under current Eleventh Amendment doctrines: individ-
uals in need of an accommodation could still prevail by suing a
state official for prospective relief, while individuals harmed by in-
tentional discrimination would no longer be barred from obtaining
back pay or other retrospective relief. But such a sensible scheme
is virtually impossible under the Court's current rigid approach to
Section 5.
Although a balancing test might thus lead to a partial overruling
of Garrett, it is unlikely to affect the Court's other Eleventh
2' For a similar plea for candor about a statute's actual impact on federalism, see Post
and Siegel, 112 Yale L J at 2048-58 (cited in note 34). For an analogous argument in
the context of administrative agencies, see Lisa Schultz Bressman, Beyond Accountability:
Arbitrariness and Legitimacy in the Administrative State, 78 NYU L Rev 461 (2003).
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Amendment precedents. Even a candid Court is likely to be willing
to hold that the property interests at stake in patent or trademark
cases, or the need to protect individuals over forty from discrimi-
nation by their (often older) employers, or even a desire to com-
pensate overtime work at a higher rate, do not outweigh state sov-
ereignty concerns.
Here, then, is the bottom line. The primary advantage of a
bright-line rule, such as the one the Court purports to follow in
its Section 5 cases, is that it is supposed to constrain the discretion
of judges. The decision in Hibbs, however, shows that at least this
bright-line rule is not a constraint. If the rule does not serve its
intended purpose, and adherence to the rule demands an intolera-
ble level of precedential manipulation, then it is time to abandon
the rule. Indeed, in the context of the scope of Congress's Section
5 authority, no bright-line rule will work, because the balance of
power among Congress, the Court, and the states is too complex
and fluid. Only a test that gives the Court flexibility but forces it
to justify its choices has any hope of succeeding. 2 9
c
There is one last notable aspect of my discussion of the interre-
lationships among precedent, candor, and the choice between
bright-line rules and flexible balancing tests: Justice O'Connor ap-
pears to play a pivotal role. Her application of precedent was
unique in all the cases other than Hibbs, and was shared only by
Chief Justice Rehnquist in Hibbs itself. She authored the majority
opinion in Grutter, and was one of only two Justices (the other
was Justice Breyer) in the majority in both Grutter and Gratz. Even
more intriguing, she was the primary modern architect of the bal-
ancing test used in the legislative courts context, and has previously
exhibited a distaste for bright-line rules.13°
129 There is, of course, a lively literature on whether this is true beyond Section 5: consti-
tutional scholars debate endlessly the relative virtues of rules and standards, categorization
and balancing, and theory-driven and pragmatist judging. This article is not the place to
rehash that debate, although it is intended as a (minor) contribution to it.
30 Besides the legislative courts cases, there are other indications the Justice O'Connor
favors multifactor balancing tests over bright lines. Her concurrence in Employment Division
v Smith argued that the same result could be reached by using a balancing test. 494 US
872, 903-07. See also Suzanna Sherry, Civic Virtue and the Feminine Voice in Constitutional
Adjudication, 72 Va L Rev 543, 604-13 (1986).
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Based on my analysis, one might argue that recently Justice
O'Connor seems to be professing an adherence to mechanical
rules but actually applying the more flexible standards she has tra-
ditionally favored. This article has suggested that both Hibbs and
Grutter exhibit this pattern. Her votes in Grutter and Gratz are
even more interesting at a deeper level. The primary difference
between the affirmative action program upheld in Grutter and the
one invalidated in Gratz was that the latter applied a rigid formula
while the former required individualized consideration of all appli-
cants. One might therefore argue that Justice O'Connor is in-
structing universities to use her preferred method of decision
making.131
But the legislative courts cases-as well as others-suggest that
sometimes Justice O'Connor has been open about her application
of more flexible tests. Why not last Term? Resolving that puzzle
is beyond the scope of this article, but I offer a few possibilities.
Perhaps she is afraid that candor in cases involving some type of
discrimination might have adverse consequences. Perhaps she has
been influenced by Justice Scalia, who has argued at various times
for rigid rules, visible constraints, and judicial lack of candor.132
Perhaps long tenure, especially during times of political change or
turmoil, affects judges' outlook. Whatever the reason, the conse-
quences are troubling.
CONCLUSION
Despite some appearances to the contrary, precedent is not
infinitely malleable. In this article, I have tried to identify the most
egregious distortions of precedent from the 2002 Term, and con-
clude that this Court-especially Justice O'Connor-seems partic-
ularly inclined to maintain a facade of adhering to precedent rather
than straightforwardly acknowledging its limitations or weak-
nesses. Nowhere is that more apparent than in the Court's evalua-
1l1 A final irony, however, is that the likely effect of the two affirmative action cases will
be to force universities with large applicant pools to disguise the use of rigid mechanical
formulae, pretending that they are instead engaged in individualized consideration. Univer-
sities will thus be engaging in the same dissembling that characterizes Justice O'Connor's
recent decisions-but in reverse.
132 See Daniel A. Farber and Suzanna Sherry, Desperately Seeking Certainty: The Misguided
Search for Constitutional Foundations 29-54 (Chicago, 2002).
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tion of the constitutionality of federal statutes enacted under Sec-
tion 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court's need to distort
precedent to uphold the FMLA in Nevada Department of Human
Services v Hibbs illustrates the weaknesses of the Court's current
Section 5 doctrine. My proposed replacement for that doctrine
builds on Hibbs and has the added benefit of forcing the Court to
confront openly the issues that led it to distort precedent. Thus,
while my test may produce results that are neither better nor more
predictable than the results under the Court's test, it will at least
produce greater candor.
This Term, Justice Scalia accused the majority of playing fast
and loose with stare decisis.133 But a candid overruling is still better
than pretending that the Court is following precedent when it is
not. Ultimately, then, the decision in Hibbs tells us a great deal
more about the integrity of the Court and the soundness of current
doctrine than it does about the constitutionality of the FMLA.
"' Lawrence v Texas, 123 S Ct 2472, 2487-91 (2003) (Scalia dissenting).
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